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Comment
Towards a Rational Jurisprudence of Computer-
Related Patentability in Light of In re Alappat
John A Burtis
In a 1994 decision, In re Alappat, the Federal Circuit ex-
tended patent protection to an invention that uses a computer
programmed to solve a unique set of mathematical equations.1
The court ostensibly designed the decision to initiate a cease-fire
to the twenty-year war over the patentability of computer
software under federal patent law.2 The Federal Circuit, how-
ever, missed the opportunity to establish a coherent doctrine of
software patentability and instead issued a fractured opinion
rife with unsupported conclusions.3
The question whether computer-related inventions driven
by mathematically-based software deserve the market protec-
tion afforded under federal patent law has vexed both theorists
and practitioners since computers entered the marketplace some
thirty years ago. Courts continue to struggle to develop a doc-
trine of patentable subject matter that is at once stable enough
to provide predictability to the marketplace, which makes deci-
sions based on the legal protection available to technology, while
maintaining sufficient flexibility to keep abreast of ever-chang-
ing technological advancement. To date, the judiciary has of-
1. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc).
2. The United States Code governs patentable subject matter: "Whoever
invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain
a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title." 35
U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
3. Alappat addressed two distinct issues: first, the Federal Circuit's juris-
diction over the appeal of the case; and second, the merits of the Patent and
Trademark Office's final rejection of Alappat's patent application as unpatent-
able subject matter. 33 F.3d at 1526. Four of the 11 circuit judges did not reach
the patentability of Alappat's invention because their decision addressed the
court's jurisdiction. Id. Two judges dissented on the merits of Alappat's patent
application. Thus, the opinion of the remaining five circuit judges constitutes
the majority decision. Id. This Comment addresses only the issue involving the
merits of Alappat's claimed invention as patentable subject matter.
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fered only a host of jumbled decisions generally disallowing
software patents predicated on the principle that algorithm-
based inventions fall somewhere outside the realm of patentable
subject matter.4 Those affected by an enlarged realm of patenta-
ble subject matter-developers, manufacturers, and consumers
of computer software-need a more coherent resolution of this
question. 5
This Comment argues that the Federal Circuit decided
Alappat correctly, but failed to provide doctrinal stability to the
broader issues it attempted to address. Part I provides a brief
history of the legal principles encumbering the definition of pat-
entable subject matter under the patent code, setting three lead-
ing Supreme Court cases against the backdrop of Congress's
statutory framework. Part H describes In re Alappat. Part III
argues that the Alappat majority, distracted by a narrow issue
of patent claim construction, failed to address the broader issue
of patentable subject matter while the dissent, which did ad-
dress the underlying issue, misinterpreted the facts of the case.
Part II also, it proposes a model for determining patentable sub-
ject matter when elements of a patent claim are directed to
4. Long-standing precedent disallows laws of nature, natural phenomena,
and abstract ideas as patentable subject matter. Over the last two decades the
Supreme Court has created an additional limitation on patentable subject mat-
ter by excluding mathematical algorithms. See infra part I.B (discussing the
leading Supreme Court cases). Because a mathematical "code" is the heart of
any computer software, this limitation essentially disallows software patents.
Consequently, copyright has historically been the only intellectual property
protection available to software products.
Copyright generally protects only literary aspects of the software code lan-
guage. Although a copyright covers more than exact- duplication or translation
of the code, it is limited in scope to protect only the particular expression of the
general "idea" of the software package. Computer Associates Intl, Inc. v. Altai,
982 F.2d 693, 703 (2d Cir. 1992). A patent, by contrast, protects the utilitarian
aspects of the software product by covering both its uses and literary attributes.
A patent therefore offers broader protection for software and is potentially
much more lucrative to industry developers. Of course, the intellectual prop-
erty rights arising from a patent and a copyright are not mutually exclusive,
and both may apply to a single product provided their respective requirements
are independently met. David A Einhorn, Copyright and Patent Protection for
Computer Software: Are they Mutually Exclusive?, SOFrWARE PROTECTION, May
1988, at 1, 6.
5. The issue of software 'patentability divides the computer industry.
Compare Patent Mania is Hurting the Industry, P.C. WEEK, July 18, 1988, at 38
("Those [patent] cases hang over our collective heads like vipers about to strike
.. and [hang] new loads of fear, uncertainty, and doubt onto the backs of the
user community.") with Randall M. Whitmeyer, A Plea for Due Processes: Defin-
ing the Proper Scope of Patent Protection for Computer Software, 85 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1103, 1123 (1991) ("Patenting software algorithms is consistent with the
underlying goals of the policy patent system.").
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otherwise unpatentable subject matter. This Comment con-
cludes that this new model, which is premised on well-rooted no-
tions distinguishing unpatentable discovery from patentable
invention and which uses a concrete standard to determine a
patent claim's scope, brings consistency to the jurisprudence of
patentable subject matter while maintaining sufficient flexibil-
ity to accommodate new computer-related inventions.
I. PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER: ITS HISTORY AND
RATIONALE
A. PATENT LAW AND ITS UNDERLYING POLICIES
1. Congress's Mandate
The Constitution grants Congress the power to "promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their re-
spective Writings and Discoveries."6 Pursuant to this authority,
Congress enacted the first Patent Act in 1793, principally au-
thored by Thomas Jefferson. 7 The Act extended patent protec-
tion to "any new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new or useful improvement
[thereof]."8 This broad language staking out the territory of pat-
entable subject matter remained unchanged through successive
Patent Acts in 1836, 1870, and 1874.9 In 1952, when Congress
recodiflied this provision into 35 U.S.C. § 101, the present stan-
dard for determining patentable subject matter, the only change
made was replacing the word "art" with the word "process."10
Direct implementation of federal patent law"- now lies
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the
6. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, el. 8.
7. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980) (quoting Patent Act
of Feb. 21, 1793, § 1, 1 Stat. 319).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 309.
10. See S. REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1952); H.R. REP. No. 1923,
82d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1952); see also supra note 2 (quoting § 101).
11. Congress has the exclusive authority to create and administer patent
law in the United States. The federal patent code therefore wholly preempts
any state attempt to extend patent-like protection to a broader subject matter
class. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141,
151 (1989) ("The novelty and nonobviousness requirements of patentability em-
body a congressional understanding, implicit in the Patent Clause itself, that
free exploitation of ideas will be the rule, to which the protection of a federal
patent is the exception."). State laws protecting trade secrets, however, are not
preempted by the patent code because courts do not consider the two areas to be
in direct conflict with one another. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S.
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Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC).12 Anticipating
the complexities of patentable subject matter issues, Congress
clearly directed reviewing courts to give § 101 a liberal construc-
tion.13 The legislative history of the 1952 Act indicates congres-
sional intent to bring into the realm of § 101 "anything under
the sun that is made by man."14
2. Basic Policies Underlying Patent Protection of Technology
A patent grants a qualifying individual the right to exclude
others from making, using, or selling his or her invention for a
limited period of time.15 To qualify for a patent, an inventor
must present and disclose a new, useful, and nonobvious inven-
tion16 to the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO).' 7 Patent law
470, 493 (1974); see also infra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing state
trade secret doctrines).
12. On October 1, 1982, to stabilize patent law, Congress created under the
Federal Courts Improvement Act, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
(CAFC). ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCuIT ix (2d ed.
1991). The CAFC has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from final decisions of
district courts in those cases where the district court's jurisdiction was based on
the patent provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1988). Id. Previously, the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) heard direct appeals from the Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) regarding the disposition of individual patent applica-
tions while the circuit courts of appeals handled all other patent-related issues.
Id.
13. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
14. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 1979, supra note 10, at 5; H.R. REP. No. 1923,
supra note 10, at 6).
15. The Constitution's Patent Clause establishes this right. U.S. CONST.
art. 1, § 8, cl. 8; see also supra note 6 and accompanying text (quoting the Pat-
ent Clause). A time-limited patent strikes a balance between the American dis-
taste for monopolies against a desire to encourage innovation by excluding
others from practicing one's invention. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1,
10-11 (1966).
Three types of patents currently exist: utility patents, design patents, and
plant patents. Utility patents, by far the most common, cover new, nonobvious,
and useful machines, articles of manufacture, compositions of matter, and
processes by protecting the utility of the claimed invention for 17 years. 35
U.S.C. § 154 (1988). Design patents protect the unique appearance or design of
articles of manufacture for a term of 14 years. Id. §§ 171-73. Plant patents
protect certain new asexually reproduced plant varieties for 17 years. §§ 161-
64.
16. Newness, utility, and nonobviousness constitute the general require-
ments of patentability. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03 (1988). For a comprehensive dis-
cussion of these requirements, see DONALD S. CHIsuM, PATENTs: A TREATISE ON
THE LAw OF PATENTABiLrrY, VALiDrrY AND INFRINGEMENT §§ 1-4 (1994).
A patent has two parts: a disclosure that describes the invention's work-
ings such that anyone knowledgeable in the relevant art can practice the inven-
tion, and claims that define the "metes and bounds" of the property interest in
the patent. Id. § 16.02(1).
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thus serves two purposes: first, it encourages innovation by re-
warding diligent inventors for developing certain new and useful
ideas;' 8 and second, it provides the public with detailed access to
emerging technology.' 9 These two policy rationales share strong
roots in concepts of natural rights,20 and are in some tension
with one another.
This tension results from the natural "right" to draw knowl-
edge from the public domain and appropriate it for private use.2 '
One who exercises this right can choose either to use the knowl-
edge as it exists in the public domain or to improve upon it by
creating something else novel and useful.22 If that individual
chooses the latter, she is an "inventor" and possesses certain
natural rights to her unique creation.23 Our "inventor" has an-
other choice upon conceiving her idea: she can conceal her crea-
tion, choosing to keep the nature of her idea hidden from the
17. The PTO, a part of the Department of Commerce, is the agency respon-
sible for patent administration. 35 U.S.C. § 1 (1988 & Supp. H 1990). The PTO
issues a patent after examining an application against the statutory require-
ments. An examiner who specializes in a particular technologic field makes an
initial determination to either allow or reject a pending patent application. A
rejected applicant may petition for a review of the examiner's determination to
the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences,
whose ultimate ruling is reviewable by the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit. HARMON, supra note 12, at 510-11; see also supra note 12 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the Federal Courts Improvement Act). A PTO-granted
patent is presumed valid. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
18. This purpose is perhaps best explained in terms of contract theory. A
qualifying inventor who has complete control over the embodiment of his or her
idea has some natural exclusive right to it. See infra notes 21-27 and accompa-
nying text (discussing these natural rights). If the public wishes to gain access
to full disclosure of that technology, natural principles of equity require it to
provide consideration. This consideration takes the form of a monopoly grant
for a limited period of time. See generally GEORGE T. CURTIS, A TREATISE ON
THE LAw OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS As ENACTED AND ADMINISTERED
IN THE UNITED STATES OF AmERICA ix-xxii, 1-2 (3d ed. 1867) (describing a pat-
ent as compensation to an inventor).
19. See CURTIs, supra note 18, at ix-xxii, 1-2.
20. For a general analysis of patent law in terms of natural rights, see WIL
LIAM C. ROBINSON, ROBINSON ON PATENTS 99 24-25 (1890).
21. Natural rights permeated legal thinking when both the Constitution
and the federal patent statutes were drafted. No legal thinker of this time was
more influential than Thomas Jefferson, the father of American patent law. Ac-
cording to Jefferson, "that ideas should freely spread from one to another over
the globe, for the moral and mutual instruction of man, and improvement of his
condition, seems to have been peculiarly and benevolently designed by nature."
THOMAS JEFFERSON, WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 334 (Saul K. Padover ed.,
1967).
22. ROBINSON, supra note 20, § 24.
23. Id.
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public,24 or she can inject her invention into the public do-
main.25 If she chooses to disclose her idea without seeking a
patent, she freely dedicates it to the public, where it becomes the
common property of all humanity.26 From this time forward,
the public has the right to that idea.27
Within this conceptualized framework must lie a recogni-
tion that those phenomena describing natural activity alone
24. State and common law doctrines of trade secrets protect an inventor
who chooses to keep and use her invention in secret. The most recent restate-
ment, the Uniform Trade Secret Act (UTSA), has become law in 40 states. MEL-
VIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAw § 3.04 (1994). The UTSA defines a trade
secret as:
[TInformation, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, de-
vise, method, technique, or process, that:
(i) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not
being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by
proper means by other persons who can use and obtain economic value
from its disclosure or use, and
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circum-
stances to maintain its secrecy.
UTSA § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 438 (1985). The UTSA provides injunctive remedies
and monetary damages for misappropriation of trade secrets. See generally JA-
GER, supra, § 3.04 (detailing the UTSA); ROBERT P. MERGES, PATENT LAW AND
PoLicY: CASES AND MATERIALS 953-85 (1992) (discussing the policies underly-
ing trade secret law and comparing them to patent law).
If an inventor keeps her invention as a trade secret and uses it in the mar-
ketplace, she abandons her right to seek a patent unless she files a patent ap-
plication within one year of its introduction to the public. This is known as a
statutory bar. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988). The statutory bar rests on the notion
that the rights secured under patent and trade secret law are inherently incon-
sistent because the entire justification for government intrusion into the free
market by way of the patent system is to secure public access to technology.
See, e.g., MacBeth-Evans Glass Co. v. General Elec. Co., 246 F. 695, 698 (6th
Cir. 1917) (holding that an inventor who elected to keep his invention a secret
instead of applying for a patent could not turn around and assert the inconsis-
tent patent right).
25. An inventor can inject her invention into the public domain in two
ways. Because she invented something new and valuable, she can use her nat-
ural right to that invention to bargain with the government for a patent. See
supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing patent law in terms of con-
tract theory). By receiving a patent, the inventor releases the nature of her
invention to the public in return for an exclusive right to make, use, and sell the
invention. An inventor can also inject her invention into the public domain by
outright dedication. She can dedicate her work voluntarily, such as by publish-
ing an article describing the invention without the intent to seek a patent, or
she can dedicate her invention to the public involuntarily by failing to seek a
patent within a statutorilyprescribed time and falling prey to the statutory bar.
See supra note 24 (discussing the statutory bar).
26. ROBINSON, supra note 20, § 24 ("An idea once communicated can no
longer be exclusively appropriated and enjoyed.").
27. Id. Once an idea becomes a part of the public domain, all individuals
have an equal right to its use.
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originate and remain in the public domain.28 Such "universal
tools" 29 of science ought to be available for anyone's purposeful
use, and public policy should encourage uses of those tools to
promote scientific progress.30 A distinction here, however, is
necessary. Scientific progress properly divides itself into two
categories: progress that expands humanity's understanding of
the universe (labeled properly as pure "discovery"), and progress
that borrows from existing knowledge to develop practical appli-
cations in the working world (labeled properly as pure
"invention). 31
Within this framework, a discoverer cannot claim an exclu-
sive right to his "discovery" because it represents a truth that
has always existed in the public domain.32 The discoverer plays
the role of a teacher, communicating to the public the workings
of its natural surroundings. 33 In contrast, an inventor does have
legitimate claim to an exclusive right to her "invention" because
28. Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1852) ("A principle, in
the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot
be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive right.").
29. See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) ("Phenomena of
nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual con-
cepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and technologi-
cal work"); see also Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127,
130 (1948) ("He who discovers a hitherto unknown phenomenon of nature has
no claim to a monopoly of it which the law recognizes.").
30. Of course, this public policy is commanded by the Constitution. See
supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing the Patent Clause).
31. The conceptualized distinction between pure discovery and pure inven-
tion is one that the courts have never explicitly adopted. This classification,
however, is critically important to the understanding of patentable subject mat-
ter as it relates to computer-related inventions. It also serves as the basis of the
proposed model that this Comment presents and is included at this point to
provide the reader a foundation by which to interpret the background case law
presented. For a brief discussion of this distinction, see PETERn D. ROSENBERG,
PATENT LAw BASIcs § 1.04 (1994).
32. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing the influence of
natural rights on American patent law).
33. This educational role rests on the notion that a discovery expands the
totality of human understanding. If one accepts that the substance of pure dis-
covery has existed since time immemorial in some pristine form, functioning
but utterly unexplained by humanity, and one accepts further that all of hu-
manity claims an interest in those preexisting natural workings, then one is
compelled to the conclusion that, irrespective of the amount "sweat" endured by
the discoverer in uncovering that truth, she is not entitled to claim that truth as
hers alone.
Thus, for example, Einstein's development of the theory of special and gen-
eral relativity is only an explanation of a phenomena that acted upon the uni-
verse for all eternity. Einstein was limited to teaching us this theory rather
than claiming a property interest in his discoveries, because they were never
his alone, but instead belonged to all humanity.
1995] 1135
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:1129
her invention represents something that humanity did not al-
ready possess. 34 The line dividing pure "discovery," which
should not be patentable subject matter,35 and pure "invention,"
which should,3 6 marks the boundary of patentable subject mat-
ter. Great difficulty, however, lies in defining this boundary, as
reflected in the following discussion.
34. The paradigmatic pure inventor stands in contrast to the pure discov-
erer in that she does not, by definition, uncover any new physical "truth." She
creates some new, useful, and nonobvious application of the principles of nature
whether or not, in fact, those principles are well understood. It is quite possi-
ble, in this respect, that reasons for an invention's function remain scientifically
unexplained though the invention is of great utility to society. Catalysis is an
example. Even today, surface science is largely unexplained theoretically, yet
nearly all synthetic chemicals make use of catalysts of all sorts. See, e.g.,
KUANG-HuI LiN ET AL., PER's CHEMAIcAL ENGINEERS' HANDBOOK 4-36 to 4-42
(Robert H. Perry & Don W. Green eds., 6th ed. 1984) (discussing the basic
properties of catalysts). Medicines yield other classic examples. Many medici-
nal mechanisms are unexplained in theory, yet in manufactured form, any
number of medications are prescribed simply because they bring about the de-
sired physiological effect. See, e.g., THE MERCK NmDEx 39 (Susan Budavari ed.,
11th ed. 1989) (describing the properties of a common analgesic). In such cases
as these, the science of engineering and manufacture leapfrogs progress in
theory.
Of course, most modern scientific and technical development blend discov-
ery and invention. Herein lies the difficulty of determining to what extent such
mixed advancements should be afforded patent protection. See infra part
llI.B.1 (discussing the need for a patentability test to distinguish between dis-
covery and invention).
35. Pure discovery lies squarely in the public domain, even to the extent it
remains undiscovered. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (noting that
the fruits of discovery belong to all of humanity). Because anyone uncovering
this knowledge cannot claim a property interest in that discovery, that individ-
ual possesses nothing with which to bargain with the public for a patent. Theo-
retically, the public already has complete access to that information.
This conclusion may be somewhat counterintuitive, because the underlying
purpose of patent law is to encourage public dissemination and disclosure of
knowledge. There seems from this perspective no impediment to giving a com-
mercial advantage to the discoverer willing to share his discovery with the pub-
lic, for there is no corresponding duty to the discoverer to release the
information in his possession. Under the construct of patent law in terms of
natural property rights, however, this argument must fail, because the exist-
ence of a property interest in that information is a predicate to the right to
bargain with the government for a patent. For a more detailed discussion of
patent law in terms of contract theory, see RoSENBERG, supra note 31, § 1.02.
36. In contrast to pure discovery, pure invention occupies the heart of pat-
entable subject matter, those new, useful, and nonobvious applications of scien-
tific and technical knowledge. See supra note 16 and accompanying text
(discussing patentability requirements).
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B. THE COURTS' APPROACHES TO COMPUTER-RELATED
PATENTABILITY
The Supreme Court has addressed the patentability of com-
puter-related inventions in three principal cases: Gottschalk v.
Benson,8 7 Parker v. Flook,3 8 and Diamond v. Diehr.3 9 Although
some commentators argue that Benson and Flook are irreconcil-
able with Diehr,40 the Court never has explicitly overruled
either of the two earlier cases. Flawed as the trilogy may be, it
forms the backbone of the current judicial approach to the issue.
Not surprisingly, lower courts have had considerable difficulty
in implementing the Supreme Court's reasoning and their deci-
sions contribute to the confused state of the law faced by the
Federal Circuit in Alappat.
1. The Supreme Court Trilogy: Benson, Flook, and Diehr
Although the jurisprudence of patentable subject matter
dates back to the original patent legislation,41 the Supreme
Court first considered the patentability of computer software in
its landmark 1972 case Gottschalk v. Benson.42 Before Benson,
the legal framework for patentability under § 101 had evolved
into a judicially defined set of principles dictating that such
things as laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
37. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
38. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
39. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
40. See, e.g., Gregory J. Maier, Software Protection-Integrating Patent,
Copyright, and Trade Secret Law, 69 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 151, 153-56 (1987) (ar-
guing that the cases comprising the Court's trilogy are irreconcilable). But see
Jur Strobos, Stalking the Elusive Patentable Software: Are There Still Diehr or
Was it Just a Flook?, 6 HARv. J.L. TECH. 363, 365 (1993) ("[Tihe Supreme Court,
through the years, has not altered its view of software patentability.").
41. Some of the cases discussing the unpatentablility of abstract ideas and
natural truths include The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1, 534-35 (1888) (uphold-
ing a patent to Bell's narrowest claim to the telephone); O'Reilly v. Morse, 56
U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112,119-20 (1853) (denying Morse's broad claim to his inven-
tion of the telegraph for the use of "electromagnetism, however developed, for
marking or printing intelligible characters, signs, or letters, at any distances");
Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 176-77 (1852) (finding a patent ex-
ceedingly broad to the extent that it essentially claimed only an idea); Hotel
Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467,467-70 (2d Cir. 1908) (invali-
dating a patent claim to a method of doing business to prevent waiter and cash-
ier theft by establishing paper "accounts" with a unique code tracking
transactions made by each employee); Detmond v. Reeves, 7 F. Cas. 547, 549
(No. 3,831) (E.D. Pa. 1851) ("The patent must be for a thing-not for an idea
merely.").
42. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
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ideas43 fell outside the realm of permissible statutory subject
matter.44 The oft-quoted embodiment of these exceptions is that
Albert Einstein could not have patented E = mc and Sir Isaac
Newton could not have patented the laws of motion.45
The Benson Court reviewed a patent application disclosing
a method for converting binary-coded decimal (BCD) numerals
to pure binary numerals, 46 a procedure fundamental to the effi-
cient storage of data in the then-emerging high-speed computer
43. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981). These three categories
evolved from somewhat more generalized principles. See, e.g., Rubber-Tip Pen-
cil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498, 507 (1874) ("An idea of itself is not
patentable, but a new device by which it may be made practically useful is.");
Tatham, 55 U.S. (15 How.) at 174-75 ("A principle, in the abstract, is a funda-
mental truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one
can claim in either of them an exclusive right."); In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 965
(C.C.P-A. 1979) (finding it well established that "principles, laws of nature,
mental processes, intellectual concepts, ideas, natural phenomena, mathemati-
cal formulae, methods of calculation, fundamental truths, original causes, mo-
tives, [and] the Pythagorean Theorem" do not fall within § 101).
44. The phrase "statutory subject matter" is shorthand for denoting the
line drawn by § 101 between those inventions worthy and unworthy of patent
protection. Loose use of the phrase, however, has led to some debate concerning
tests for defining the line. Strictly construed, the § 101 subject matter question
stands as a predicate to the other patentability requirements of novelty, utility,
and nonobviousness. See, e.g., Bergy, 596 F.2d at 959-61 (characterizing two
doors through which an inventor must pass to obtain a patent: the first re-
quires that the inventor have an invention worthy of patenting, and the second
requires the invention to meet the other requirements of the patent code). Nev-
ertheless, some tests enunciated to determine patentable subject matter incor-
porate requirements of novelty, utility, and nonobviousness into the question of
whether the invention is of a type deserving patent protection. See infra notes
62, 133 and accompanying text (citing such tests).
45. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) ("[A] new
mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant found in the wild is not patenta-
ble subject matter. Likewise, Einstein could not patent his celebrated law that
E=mc2; nor could Newton have patented the law of gravity.").
46. Benson, 409 U.S. at 64-67. The decimal system expresses a number
using 10 digits (0-9) by placing them in sequence by increasing powers. Thus
"53" in decimal notation corresponds to (5x10') + (3x100). The binary system,
much more useful to a computer consisting of a complex system of semiconduc-
tors acting as on/off switches, uses only two digits ("0" and "1") to express a
number in increasing powers of 2. In binary notation, "53" is expressed as
110101, or (lx26) + (lx25) + (0x24) + (lx22) + (0x2') + (x2°). Binary coded deci-
mal numerals, or BCD's, combine elements of both these systems, incorporating
the ordering of digits in ascending powers of ten but expressing the individual
digits in terms of binary notation. To illustrate by returning to the example of
the number "53," the number is expressed in BCD as a five and a three in bi-
nary form (0101 and 0011 respectively) next to each other as if in powers of 10,
or "0101 0011." See generally PAuL HoRowrrz & WMFIELD HILL, THE ART OF
ELE CTRONICS 476 (2d ed. 1989) (describing BCDs and their utility to the
electonics industry).
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market.47 The heart of the claimed invention was a novel math-
ematical algorithm.48 After citing to its precedent denying pat-
entability for abstract ideas, 49 the Court denied patentability for
this method. 50
In reaching its decision, the Court touched on two key is-
sues that were to be expanded in subsequent cases. 51 The Court
found it important that the claimed steps for computing the re-
sult were so broadly recited as to make purely mental processes
infringing behavior.52 Based on this, the Court held that the
claimed invention was so broad and abstract that it "wholly pre-
empted" the use of the algorithm53 and that it covered both
known and unknown uses of the BCD-to-pure-binary-conver-
sion.54 This preemption, therefore, effectively took away from
47. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Pat-
ent Protection for Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions,
39 EMORY L.J. 1025, 1049 (1990) (discussing the significance of this invention to
the computer industry).
48. The Court defined a mathematical algorithm as "[a] procedure for solv-
ing a given type of mathematical problem." Benson, 409 U.S. at 65.
49. Id. at 67-71 (citing Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S.
127 (1948); The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1 (1888); O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S.
(15 How.) 62 (1853); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (55 How.) 156 (1852)); see also
supra note 43 (discussing these cases).
50. Benson, 409 U.S. at 71-72.
51. See infra notes 56-64 and accompanying text (discussing Flook); infra
notes 65-72 and accompanying text (discussing Diehr).
52. Benson, 409 U.S. at 67. According to the Court:
The method sought to be patented varies the ordinary arithmetic steps
a human would use by changing the order of the steps, changing the
symbolism for writing the multiplier used in some steps, and by taking
subtotals after each successive operation .... And, as noted, [the
mathematical procedures] can also be performed without a computer.
Id.
53. This wholesale preemption rule constituted the Court's "nutshell"
holding:
The mathematical formula involved here has no substantial practical
application except in connection with a digital computer, which means
that if the judgment below is affirmed, the patent would wholly pre-
empt the mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a pat-
ent on the algorithm itself.
Id. at 71-72.
54. The Court stated:
Here the "process" claim is so abstract and sweeping as to cover both
known and unknown uses of the BCD to pure binary conversion. The
end use may (1) vary from the operation of a train to verification of
drivers' licenses to researching law books for precedents and (2) may be
performed through existing machinery or future-devised machinery or
without any apparatus.
Id. at 68.
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the public something it already possessed, the mathematical
"truth" that Benson's algorithm embodied.55
The Court revisited these § 101 issues six years later in
Parker v. Flook.56 Flook involved a patent claim to a method for
updating the alarm limits of a petroleum refining process. 57 The
claimed invention used a small computer programmed to use a
mathematical equation that a group of engineers developed spe-
cifically for the process. 58 The patent drafter of the Flook inven-
tion attempted to avoid the problems of Benson simply by
writing the patent application in a way that limited the use of
the formula to hydrocarbon refining.59 The drafter hoped that
this limitation avoided "wholly preempting" use of the formula
in other applications.60
In deciding that this invention also failed to meet the statu-
tory subject matter requirements of § 101,61 the Court retreated
55. See supra part IA (discussing the tension between discovery and
invention).
56. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
57. The Court characterized the nature of the invention as follows:
An "alarm limit" is a number. During catalytic conversion processes,
operating conditions such as temperature, pressure, and flow rates are
constantly monitored. When any of these "process variables" exceeds a
predetermined "alarm limit," an alarm may signal the presence of an
abnormal condition indicating either inefficiency or perhaps danger.
Fixed alarm limits may be appropriate for a steady operation, but dur-
ing transient operating situations, such as start-up, it may be neces-
sary to "update" the alarm limits periodically.
Id. at 585.
Flook's method invention consisted of three steps: measurement of the pro-
cess variable at a predetermined interval, solution of a novel equation to pro-
duce a new alarm base using the new variable measurement, and the
adjustment of the new alarm limit. Id. at 597-98. The mathematical equation
used in the second step represented the only advancement over the prior art.
Id. at 585-86.
58. The patent application disclosed the following simple arithmetic equa-
tion that uses a weighting factor:
B, = Bo(I-F) + PVL(F)
where: B, = new alarm base
Bo = original alarm base
PVL = measured present variable level
F = weighting factor between zero and one
The weighting factor, F, is chosen individually by the operator for the pro-
cess based on experience. The application disclosed no criteria for its selection.
Id. 597-98.
59. The patent application limited the claims to the use of the disclosed
formula for updating alarm limits for any process variable involved in a process
comprising the catalytic conversion of hydrocarbons. Id. at 586.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 589.
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from its wholesale preemption rule by noting that the only nov-
elty to Flook's invention was the formula itself,62 and that the
inventor could not claim statutory subject matter in insignifi-
cant "post-solution" activity or arbitrary field of use limita-
tions.63 The inventor here simply cleverly used a known
mathematical expression, and by so doing attempted to appro-
priate something already in the public domain.64
The Supreme Court's most recent decision concerning pat-
entability of a mathematically-based idea under § 101 is Dia-
mond v. Diehr.65 Diehr involved an improvement in the
62. Id. at 588 ("We also assume, since respondent does not challenge the
examiner's finding, that the formula is the only novel feature of respondent's
method.").
The Court took, perhaps unnecessarily, a jump in its interpretation of this
fact by announcing a rule that a principle of nature or mathematical formula is
"well-known" for the purposes of evaluating § 101. Id. at 592. This statement
has two possible ramifications. It could be interpreted as importing other statu-
tory notions of novelty and nonobviousness under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-03 (1988),
violating the rule that § 101 stands alone as a predicate for statutory subject
matter before other statutory requirements come into play. Alternatively, how-
ever, this language could be interpreted as merely establishing the premise
that to the degree a given mathematical equation merely expresses an unap-
plied principle or law of nature, it is taken to exist already in the public domain.
See supra part IA (discussing the policies underlying patent law). Thus,
although an inventor is free to use that expression as a tool for the development
of his craft, he cannot directly claim a patent for it. He can only seek a patent
on its application in some form.
63. The majority stated:
The notion that post-solution activity, no matter how conventional or
obvious in itself, can transform an unpatentable principle into a pat-
entable process exalts form over substance. A competent draftsman
could attach some form of post-solution activity to almost any mathe-
matical formula; the Pythagorean theorem would not have been pat-
entable, or partially patentable, because a patent application
contained a final step indicating that the formula, when solved, could
be usefully applied to existing surveying techniques. The concept of
patentable subject matter under § 101 is not "like a nose of wax which
may be turned and twisted in any direction."
Flook, 437 U.S. at 590 (citations omitted).
Three justices joined in a dissent, largely because of a disagreement over
this point. The author of the dissenting opinion, Justice Potter Stewart, distin-
guished Benson on the ground that it stood for the wholesale preemption rule.
Id. at 599 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Flook's application presented no preemp-
tion problems, he argued, because the field of use limitation solution of the al-
gorithm, per se, would not infringe the patent's claim. Justice Stewart noted:
"The present case is a far different one. The issue here is whether a claimed
process loses its status of subject-matter patentability simply because one step
in the process would not be patentable subject matter if considered in isolation."
Id. at 589 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citations omitted)
64. See supra note 31-36 and accompanying text (discussing the distinction
between discovery and invention).
65. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
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industrial process for curing rubber by using a version of the
Arrhenius equation to continually update process variables. 66
The Court this time upheld the patent, concluding that unlike in
Benson and Flook, the formula was part of an otherwise statu-
tory process 67 with a clearly physical product: cured rubber.68
66. Curing rubber requires placing uncured synthetic rubber into a mold
under heat and pressure to produce a shaped and functionally useful end prod-
uct. Before Diehr's invention, the cure time for the process could not be calcu-
lated with certainty because there existed no way to measure the temperature
inside of the mold with precision. Id. at 177-79. The calculations involved use
of the well-known Arrhenius equation:
In v = CT + x
where: v = total cure time
C = activation constant (unique to the process)
T = temperature inside the mold
x = constant (unique to the mold geometry)
Id. at 177 n.2. Because of the difficulty in determining the inside temperature,
prior art approximated T in the above equation to calculate the cure time.
Diehr invented a way to continuously monitor the temperature inside the mold
by use of thermocouples placed inside the operating press, to feed those mea-
surements continuously into a computer that updated the cure time with each
new temperature measurement, and to open the press when the recalculated
cure time equaled the previous value. Id.
67. The majority first examined Benson and Flook in light of the historical
judicial prohibition against the patentability of ideas and natural phenomena.
Id. at 185 ("Our recent holdings in [Benson and Nook], both of which are com-
puter-related, stand for no more than these long-established principles."). The
Court then turned its attention to Diehr's invention:
[Tihe respondents here do not seek to patent a mathematical formula.
Instead, they seek patent protection for a process of curing synthetic
rubber. Their process admittedly employs a well-known mathematical
equation, but they do not seek to pre-empt the use of that equation.
Rather, they seek only to foreclose from others the use of that equation
in conjunction with all of the other steps in their claimed process ....
Obviously, one does not need a "computer" to cure natural or synthetic
rubber, but if the computer use incorporated in the process patent sig-
nificantly lessens the possibility of "overcuring" or "undercuring," the
process as a whole does not thereby become unpatentable subject
matter.
Id. at 187. In distinguishing Flook, decided only three terms earlier, the Diehr
majority, three of whom were the Flook dissenters, recognized that "a mathe-
matical formula as such is not accorded the protection of our patent laws" and
that field of use limitations and insignificant post-solution activity will not res-
cue a claim from this principle. Id. at 191-92. The Court went on to note that
[wihen a claim containing a mathematical formula implements or ap-
plies that formula in a structure or process which, when considered as
a whole, is performing a function which the patent laws were designed
to protect (e.g., transforming or reducing an article to a different state
or thing), then the claim satisfies the requirements of § 101.
Id. at 192.
68. Id. at 184.
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The Court recited that the existence of a mathematical expres-
sion in the patent alone does not bring the invention outside
§ 101.69 It is only when the inventor attempts either directly or
indirectly to patent the formula itself,70 and not merely its appli-
cation within a broader invention.71 that § 101 problems arise.72
2. Lower Courts' Implementation of the Supreme Court
Trilogy
With respect to patentability standards for computer-re-
lated inventions,73 the Federal Circuit seems to have adopted
the two-part Freeman-Walter-Abele test developed by its prede-
cessor, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, to implement
the broad patentability guidelines set out in the Supreme
Court's trilogy.74 The Freeman-Walter-Abele test first asks
whether a mathematical algorithm is either directly or indi-
rectly expressed by the claim language.75 If an algorithm is
present, the test then looks to the claim as a whole to determine
whether it is no more than the algorithm itself.76 That is, if the
algorithm is applied in one or more steps of an otherwise statu-
tory process claim,77 or one or more elements of an otherwise
69. "Arrhenius' equation is not patentable in isolation, but when a process
for curing rubber is devised which incorporates in it a more efficient solution of
the equation, that process is at the very least not barred at the threshold by
§ 101." Id. at 188.
70. This raises Benson preemption problems. Id. at 191 ("We recognize of
course that when a claim recites a mathematical formula (or scientific principle
or phenomenon of nature), an inquiry must be made into whether the claim is
seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract.").
71. Id. at 188 (quoting Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio of Am., 306 U.S.
86, 94 (1939)) ("While a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is
not a patentable invention, a novel and useful structure created with the aid of
knowledge of scientific truth may be.").
72. Id. at 189.
73. The term computer-related merely denotes that familiar Benson
problems exist in the claim, at least partiallybecause principles of nature in the
form of mathematical expressions are recited.
74. See, e.g., Arrhythmia Res. Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d
1053, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (applying the Freeman-Walter-Abele test). The test
derives its name from three cases: In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A.
1978), In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758 (C.C.P-A- 1980), and In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902
(C.C.P.A. 1982). The Federal Circuit deviates somewhat from the comprehen-
sive application of the test. See infra notes 78, 96 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the Federal Circuit's application of the test).
75. Abele, 684 F.2d at 905.
76. Id. at 905-06.
77. "Otherwise statutory" is used in the sense that the claimed invention,
absent the algorithm, falls within a § 101 category of permissible subject mat-
ter. This does not mean that the claimed invention must otherwise satisfy the
19951 1143
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:1129
statutory apparatus claim,78 the requirements of § 101 are
met.79 Although no case exists in which a claim determined to
fail the Freeman-Walter-Abele test ultimately survived § 101,
the Federal Circuit has nonetheless indicated that failure to
meet the test will not necessarily defeat the claim.8 0
Interestingly, although the Alappat court did not apply the
Freeman-Walter-Abele test,81 the test enjoys an active life in the
Patent Office. In a case decided after Alappat, In re Trovato,8 2 a
Federal Ciruit panel affirmed a PTO rejection of claims to a
method of solution to the so-called "shortest path problem." 3
The PTO Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences affirmed
statutory requirements of newness, utility, and nonobviousness. See, e.g., Ar-
rhythmia, 958 F.2d at 1058 (noting that the Freeman-Walter-Abele test is dis-
tinct from other tests of patentability).
78. Application of the Freeman-Walter-Abele test is a bit less uniform in
such cases because true apparatus claims, by definition, do not invoke any § 101
problems. See infra notes 90-92 and accompanying text (describing apparatus
claims). A court must recognize that abstract ideas and laws of nature can be
wily crafted as apparatus claims, particularly when drafted in accordance with
35 U.S.C. § 112 6 (1988), before it will subject these claims to the heightened
scrutiny of the Freeman-Walter-Abele test. See Exparte Alappat, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d
1340, 1341 (B.P.I.A. 1992) ("[Mt is recognized that the form of the claim is not
dispositive, especially where the claims are drafted in means-plus-function
('means for') terms."); see also infra note 87 (defining means-plus-function
claims).
79. Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d at 1058.
80. In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 839 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
81. See infra part H (discussing Alappat).
82. 33 U.S.P.Q.2d 1194 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Judge Nies, anAlappat dissenter,
authored the panel's decision in Trovato.
83. Karen I. Trovato and Leendart Dorst developed a method to determine
the shortest, or optimal, path between two locations given any number of rele-
vant criteria, including distance, cost, capacity, and time. Id. at 1194-95. To
this end, they modeled possible object movements in the real world by using a
graph called a "configuration space," stored in a "data structure," wherein each
node of the graph respresents a state of conditions. Id. at 1194. Using this
graphic model, an optimal path to a particular "goal" state is determined by
exploring neighboring states along the graph in successive "waves" calculating
for each a lowest optimal pathway to the "goal" state through a number of inter-
mediate states. Id. at 1194-95. The patent application disclosed a number of
uses for this method such as developing a routing system for emergency vehi-
cles using an electronic geographic map. Id. at 1196 n.2.
A representative claim to this method recites the following:
1. A method for determining motion of an object comprising the steps
of:
a) storing a configuration space data structure representing a
physical space, the configuration space data structure including repre-
sentations of the object and its environment; and
b) propogating cost waves, in the configuration space data struc-
ture, to fill the configuration space data structure with cost values ac-
cording to a space variant metric.
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the examiner's rejection of this method under § 101 by applying
the Freeman-Walter-Abele test.8 4 The Board, finding that the
claims indirectly recited a mathematical algorithm, asserted
that the claims as a whole were directed to no more than the
algorithm itself.85
C. ADDING TO THE CONFUSION: MI--Ns-PLus-FuNcTIoN"
CLAIM DRAFTING
A workable model by which to determine statutory subject
matter for inventions that disclose a mathematical algorithm
must consistently and rationally construct a patent claim and
determine its true scope. Although the Supreme Court trilogy
outlined above suggests the limits of the permissible scope of
patent claims to a process based in whole or in part on a mathe-
matical algorithm, the Court has never applied this reasoning to
the distinct, but common, practice of claiming an apparatus
solely by reference to the processes it performs.8 6 .lappat repre-
sents the Federal Circuit's first review of a claim to an appara-
tus drafted entirely in "means-plus-function" language.
8 7
Section 112 6 of the patent code allows an inventor to
claim elements of a patentable apparatus invention in language
describing the means for performing the functions of those ele-
ments.88 For example, an inventor may claim a device for hing-
Id. at 1195. Other independent claims to the method were drafted in "means
plus function" format. Id. at 1196; see also infra part IC (discussing the unique
aspects of this claim drafting format).
84. 33 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1195-96.
85. Id. The Federal Circuit panel affirmed the decision on independent
grounds, but did not overrule the Freeman-Walter-Abele test as applied by the
PTO. Id. at 1198-1200.
86. See infra notes 87-88 and accompanying text (describing the process of
naming an apparatus by describing its function).
87. "Means-plus-function" refers to the practice of claiming an apparatus
element of an invention in terms of the means to accomplish its function. See
infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text (describing "means-plus-function).
This drafting technique avoids awkward lexicography for unique aspects of an
invention and more efficiently communicates its nature. Although drafters
commonly use this mechanism to describe single elements within a claim, Alap-
pat was the first time the Federal Circuit reviewed a claim written entirely in
this format. See infra note 100 (quoting Alappat's claim). The result is unfortu-
nately some distance away from enunciating a coherent conceptual framework
88. The statutory provision provides:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means
or step for performing a specified function without the recital of struc-
ture, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be con-
strued to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described
in the specification and equivalents thereof.
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ing one portion of a piece of hardware to another as "means for
attaching piece A to piece B." Rather than encompassing all
possible means of attaching the two pieces of hardware, the stat-
utory language demands that these claims "be construed to
cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in
the specification and equivalents thereof."8 9
Functionally defined apparatus claims pose particular in-
terpretive difficulties in examining statutory subject matter re-
quirements because they blur the distinction between apparatus
and process patents. Generally speaking, true apparatus claims
will not fall prey to the judicially created mathematical al-
gorithm limitation to § 101 subject matter.90 Because all "ma-
chines" operate according to the laws of nature, and machines by
definition apply those laws to produce a useful physical result,91
these apparatus claims lie at the very heart of patentable sub-
ject matter.92 Conversely, a patent claim to a process can be
written so vaguely as to divorce the idea from its physical em-
bodiment,93 thereby running into the preemption concerns of
Benson and its progeny.94
Apparatus claims written in functional language organiza-
tionally fall somewhere between pure apparatus and pure pro-
cess claims. Any rule defining patentability for these claims
that does not investigate the true nature of the invention runs
grave risks of looking only to the form of the claim language,
35 U.S.C. § 112 1 6 (1988).
89. Id. (emphasis added). For example, if the specification to the hypothet-
ical claim for attaching the two pieces of hardware showed the use of a nail, the
claim as properly construed would be limited to attachment of the two pieces
with a nail or an equivalent structure. See, e.g., Liatram Corp. v. Rexnord Inc.,
939 F.2d 1533, 1535 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (concluding that legal equivalency requires
the accused structure to set forth every limitation as the disclosed structure
exactly or by a substantial equivalent); De Graffenried v. United States, Is
U.S.P.Q.2d 1321, 1339 (Cl. Ct. 1990) (concluding that the term "equivalents" in
§ 112 1 6 illustrates congressional intent to incorporate equivalence standards
generally recognized in patent law); see also MERGES, supra note 24, at 715-16
(comparing the doctrine of equivalents and § 112 1 6).
90. See, e.g., Ex parte Alappat, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d 1340, 1341 (B.P.A.I. 1992)
("Claims truly directed to apparatus as a 'machine' or 'manufacture' under
§ 101 do not fall within the judicially determined mathematical algorithm ex-
ception since the calculation method remains free for use by anyone not employ-
ing the specific apparatus.").
91. One dictionary defines a machine as "[a] device consisting of fixed and
moving parts that modifies mechanical energy and transmits it in a more useful
form." AamRicA HERrrAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 811 (3d ed. 1993).
92. See supra part IA.1 (discussing the history of American patent law).
93. See supra part I.B.1 (discussing Benson and its progeny).
94. Id.
1146
PATENTING ALGORITHMS
allowing inventors to manipulate subject matter limitations
merely by casting their claims in some arbitrarily sanctioned
form. Consequently, early decisions of the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals 95 applied the Freeman-Walter-Abele test to all
claims, regardless of whether those claims were drafted to a pro-
cess or an apparatus.96 The Walter court announced that "if the
functionally-defined disclosed means and their equivalents are
so broad that they encompass any and every means for perform-
ing the recited functions, the apparatus claim is an attempt to
exalt form over substance since the claim is really to the method
or series of functions itself."97 "Means-plus-function" claiming
under § 112 6 is therefore properly understood merely as a
patent drafter's tool, and is not intended as a means to expand
the scope of an invention. The choice of whether to make use of
this tool should be of no ultimate consequence to a determina-
tion of patentability under § 101.
H. 1N RE ALAPPAT
Kuriappan P. Alappat, Edward E. Averill, and James G.
Larsen98 devised a way to create a smooth waveform on the
screen of an oscilloscope. 99 At the heart of their invention was a
95. The CCPA was the forerunner to the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit. See supra note 12 (discussing the CAFC's origins).
96. See, e.g., In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 768 (C.C.P-.A 1980) (concluding
that some method and apparatus claims are indistinguishable). Interestingly,
the Federal Circuit apparently has failed to adopt this uniform approach to-
wards applying the Freeman-Walter-Abele test. Despite paying lip service to
such an approach in a recent case by restating the test as requiring that an
algorithm be applied in one or more steps of an otherwise statutory process
claim or one or more elements of an otherwise statutory apparatus claim to
satisfy the requirements of § 101, the court failed to apply the test to the appa-
ratus claims at issue in the case. Arrhythmia Res. Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix
Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see also supra notes 75-80 and ac-
companying text (discussing application of the Freeman-Walter-Abele test).
97. Walter, 618 F.2d at 768.
98. This Comment uses "Alappat" to refer collectively to Kuriappan P.
Alappat, Edward E. Averill, and James G. Larsen, all of whom were named as
inventors of the subject matter at issue in Alappat.
99. More precisely, the invention related to a means of presenting data on
a finite pixel cathode-ray tube (CRT), a visual screen like that of a television.
Such a screen is limited in its ability to show a smooth curve line because it has
only a fixed number of pixels, or illumination points. As a result, when the
screen is configured to display a data curve, rapidly rising and falling portions
of the curve, or waveform, appear jagged and discontinuous. Data "noise" also
causes similar visual difficulties. These negative effects are collectively known
as aliasing. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1537 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc).
Alappat and his colleagues developed a set of anti-aliasing mathematical
equations by which to manipulate, or normalize, the data before being fed to a
1995] 1147
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
set of mathematical equations, which in their patent application
was claimed entirely in "means-plus function" language. 00 The
Reconsideration Board of the PTO upheld the examiner's final
rejection of the invention under § 101, finding the claim so broad
as to encompass any and all means of performing the stated
functions.101 Despite the § 112 6 requirement limiting means-
plus-function apparatus claims to the disclosed structure, 0 2 the
Board stated that, absent compelling arguments to the contrary,
such broad claims should be construed to encompass all methods
of performing the recited functions.10 3 The Board construed
Alappat's invention to be a broad claim to the mathematical
equations that preempted all use of the equations and therefore
held it unpatentable under Benson.'0 4
The Federal Circuit held the PTO Board accountable for ig-
noring the statutory narrowing of means language to the struc-
CRT, such that when modified, the data present a smooth waveform. They
programmed the set of equations in an electronic circuit board comprising well-
known circuitry elements and labelled the resulting circuit board as a "raster-
izer." Id. at 1537-39.
100. The relevant independent claim to the rasterizer, Claim 15, reads:
A rasterizer for converting vector list data representing sample magni-
tudes of an input waveform into anti-aliased pixel illumination inten-
sity data to be displayed on a display means comprising:
(a) means for determining the vertical distance between the
endpoints of each of the vectors in the data list;
(b) means for determining the elevation of a row of pixels that is
spanned by the vector;
(c) means for normalizing the vertical distance and elevation;
and
(d) means for outputting illumination intensity data as a prede-
termined function of the normalized vertical distance and elevation.
Id. at 1538-39.
101. The PTO's analyses has its basis in the Freeman-Walter-Abele test. See
supra note 97 and accompanying text (discussing the Freeman-Walter-Abele
test). See generally In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 768 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (lending its
name to the test).
102. See supra note 88 (quoting § 112 1 6).
103. The Board majority stated:
In computer-related inventions, the recited means often perform the
function of "number crunching" (solving mathematical algorithms and
making calculations). In such cases the burden must be placed on the
applicant to demonstrate that the claims are truly drawn to specific
apparatus distinct from other apparatus capable of performing the
identical functions.
If this burden has not been discharged, the apparatus will be
treated as if it were drawn to the method or process which encom-
passes all of the claimed "means."
Ex parte Alappat, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d 1340, 1342 (B.P.A.I. 1992) (citing Walter, 618
F.2d at 768).
104. See supra part I.B.1 (discussing Benson).
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ture disclosed in the application 0 5 and quoted congressional
intent for broad construction of § 101.106 The court then as-
serted that, as narrowed to the disclosed structure, the raster-
izer "is not a disembodied mathematical concept which may be
characterized as an 'abstract idea,' but rather a specific machine
to produce a useful, concrete, and tangible result."10 7 The court
answered the PTO Board's concerns that the claims, though
technically to an apparatus, embodied all means of practicing
the equations by summarizing the Supreme Court's trilogy in a
single sentence:
[Alt the core of the Court's analysis in each of [the] cases lies an at-
tempt by the Court to explain a rather straightforward concept,
namely, that certain types of mathematical subject matter, standing
alone, represent nothing more than abstract ideas until reduced to
some type of practical application, and thus that subject matter is not,
in and of itself, entitled to patent protection.1 0 8
In analyzing the claim in light of the disclosed structure and
the equivalents thereof,'0 9 the majority was undisturbed that the
claim as upheld reads" o on a general purpose computer
programmed to calculate the same equation." Judge Giles S.
Rich, writing for the majority, asserted that "a general purpose
computer in effect becomes a special purpose computer once it is
programmed to perform particular functions pursuant to in-
struction from program software .... In any case, a computer,
like a rasterizer, is apparatus not mathematics." 112
Chief Judge Glenn L. Archer, joined by Judge Helen W.
Nies, dissented. 113 Chief Judge Archer agreed with the majority
that the PTO Reconsideration Board erred in failing to limit
Alappat's invention to the disclosed structure as statutorily de-
105. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1539-41 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (citing
In re Donaldson, 16 F.3d 1189, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). All of the judges reach-
ing the merits concurred on this point, interpreting "means" language under
§ 112 6 as limited to the disclosed structure and its equivalents. Id. at 1541.
106. Id. at 1542 ("Indeed the Supreme Court has acknowledged that Con-
gress intended § 101 to extend to 'anything under the sun made by man.'")
(quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)).
107. Id. at 1544.
108. Id. at 1543.
109. See supra note 88 (quoting § 112 6).
110. "Reading" is shorthand for denoting the scope of a patent claim. If a
practice or invention "reads" on a patent, it simply means that the invention or
practice constitutes infringing behavior.
111. AIappat, 33 F.3d at 1545.
112. Id.
113. Chief Judge Archer and Judge Nies both concurred with the majority's
jurisdictional decision. Id. at 1545.
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manded. 14 After examining the Supreme Court trilogy in some
depth,115 however, Chief Judge Archer criticized the majority for
finding patentability based solely on the recitation of physical
structure. 116 In arguing that Alappat's invention as narrowed
to the disclosed structure and its equivalent still failed the § 101
test, Chief Judge Archer contended that finding equivalency in a
general purpose computer programmed with the equations
proved the nonstatutory nature of the invention.117
III. TOWARD A COMPREHENSIVE PATENTABILITY
TEST FOR COMPUTER-RELATED INVENTIONS
The patentability of computer-related inventions that make
use of mathematics presents an enormous theoretical quagmire
that courts and academics have for decades been unable to re-
solve. Alappat's majority opinion, in this light, seems to be an
exasperated declaration that any computer program, once em-
bodied in a physical form, is patentable. Perhaps this approach
will placate industrial concerns and provide the stability so long
sought to the issue. Nevertheless, a return to basic principles,
without a painstaking attempt to harmonize often inconsistent
precedent, can yield a much sounder result.
A. A FRUSTRATED FEDERAL CmcuiT DECIDES AL4PPAT
The Alappat majority's opinion is obscured by its near ob-
session with the PTO's unwillingness to narrow the means-plus-
function claim to disclosed structure as demanded by the lan-
guage of § 112 6.118 As a result of its frustration, the majority
114. Id. at 1561 (Archer, C.J., dissenting) ("Of course, I agree that the
means-for-function elements in Claim 15 must be construed to cover the corre-
sponding structure described in Alappat's specification and equivalents
thereof.").
115. Id. at 1555-57 (Archer, C.J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 1557 (Archer, C.J., dissenting). Chief Judge Archer eloquently
placed his point in the context of the Supreme Court's doctrine:
Thus the dispositive issue is not whether the claim recites on its face
something more physical than just abstract mathematics. If it were,
Benson and Flook would have come out the other way and Diehr would
have been a very short opinion. The dispositive issue is whether the
invention or discovery for which an award of patent is sought is more
than just a discovery in abstract mathematics.
Id. (Archer, C.J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 1566 (Archer, C.J., dissenting) ("To find equivalence based solely
on the identity of mathematical function, with absolute disregard for the partic-
ular claimed circuitry, therefore, is to concede that Alappat's claimed circuitry
is irrelevant and nonstatutory.").
118. See supra note 88 (quoting § 112).
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errs by devoting its entire short opinion on the merits of the case
to arguments on why the disclosed interrelated elements define
a "machine."119 Although the court correctly recognizes that the
disclosed apparatus is limited in scope to accomplish a given
task, namely, presenting a smooth waveform on a CRT screen,
this point is not relevant to its analysis. The court's reasoning
instead implies that any claim that is drafted in "means-plus-
function" language and discloses physical structure constitutes a
"machine" and is therefore statutory subject matter under§ 101.120 Benson and Flook teach otherwise. 12 1 The court's ap-
proach is flawed because it fails to characterize adequately the
nature of the challenged claim reciting a mathematical al-
gorithm, determine its true scope, and apply the claim as inter-
preted to established principles of patentability.122
Furthermore, the court's willingness to define patentability
merely by applying a label of "machine" on the claim at issue
serves only to substitute one confusion for another. Previously
existing doctrine, bedrocked upon the "wholesale preemption"
rule, admittedly contorts itself through ambiguous definitions of
the classical unpatentable categories of abstract ideas, laws of
nature, and natural phenomena. The majority's approach is
similarly flawed in that it only defines patentability by negative
reference to these definitions, holding patentable any matter not
119. See supra notes 107-108 and accompanying text (quoting the Alappat
majority).
120. Chief Judge Archer's dissent points out this flaw in the majority's rea-
soning by arguing that it amounts to an attempt to resurrect precedent ex-
pressly overruled by the Supreme Court, which held that a claim is outside
§ 101 only if it recites mathematics on its face and in its entirety. Alappat, 33
F.3d at 1561 (Archer, C.J., dissenting) (citing In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237
(C.C.P.A. 1978); In re Chatfield, 545 F.2d 152 (C.C.P-. 1976); In re Bernhart,
417 F.2d 1395 (C.C.PYA 1969)).
121. Undoubtedly Benson and its progeny require a more detailed inquiry
into claims reciting a mathematical algorithm under § 101. In fact, Alappat
goes against the very result in Benson, where one of the challenged process
claims recited physical structure, a reentrant shift register. Gottschalk v. Ben-
son, 409 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1972). Likewise, although the Court upheld Diehr's
process claim, its analysis went far beyond sole reliance on the recitation of a
computer in the claim itself. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 179 n.5 (1981).
Whether Alappat's claim was to an apparatus using "means-plus-function"
language should be of no consequence to § 101 analysis. Federal Circuit cases
recognize that both apparatus and process claims require a similar treatment
under § 101. See, e.g., Arrhythmia Res. Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d
1053, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (applauding the Freeman-Walter-Abele test's exami-
nation of both process and apparatus claims for statutory subject matter when
either recites a mathematical algorithm).
122. See supra part I.2 (discussing the policy considerations underlying
patent law).
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determined to fall within one of the three categories. Instead of
articulating any new ideas for defining § 101, the majority
therefore dangerously adds an extra layer to an already clut-
tered legal issue. The Federal Circuit accidentally reached the
correct result in this case, but its analysis, if widely followed,
will prove disastrous in the future by creating an extremely mal-
leable ad hoc definitional test that will inevitably reach inconsis-
tent factual determinations and ultimately result in incorrect
patentability decisions.
Chief Judge Archer's dissent better characterizes precedent
and correctly chastises the majority for failing to to go beyond
the recitation of structure in its analysis. 123 Nonetheless, he
errs himself by misconstruing Alappat's invention after failing
to ascertain adequately the scope of the claim. By not identify-
ing the overall purpose of the claimed "machine'-to produce a
smooth waveform on a CRT screen-and by failing to incorpo-
rate that characterization into his analysis, he incorrectly as-
serts that "[t]he calculations are the beginning and end of the
claim."' 24 This assertion leads him toward an incorrect conclu-
sion that the claim encompasses all uses of the disclosed mathe-
matical algorithm and must therefore fall prey to the
preemption concerns of Benson. In short, by failing to acknowl-
edge the limitations of the invention as claimed, Chief Judge
Archer simply ends up getting the case wrong.
The historical prohibition on the patentability of natural
principles and abstract ideas detailed in Chief Archer's dissent
lacks a theoretical basis. His castigation of the majority for its
reliance on claiming form is well placed, but his strict reliance
on preemption concerns leads him to the wrong conclusion.
Chief Judge Archer, unfortunately, lacked rationally premised
principles defining unpatentable subject matter upon which to
base his preemption concerns.
Both approaches taken by the Federal Circuit in Alappat
only further confuse the jurisprudence of§ 101. This area of law
cries out for a new approach, faithful to Supreme Court prece-
dent yet not unnecessarily constrained by a wealth of inconsis-
tent lower court doctrines. 25 Section 101 cannot stand in fear of
123. Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1563 (Archer, C.J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 1564 (Archer, C.J., dissenting) (quoting In re Walter, 618 F.2d
758, 769 (1980)).
125. It is virtually impossible to harmonize early applications of the Free-
man-Walter-Abele test by the CCPA with modern Federal Circuit decisions.
See, e.g., In re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370, 1374-75 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (involving a
claim to an apparatus relating to voice recognition technology drafted using
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the development of computer-related technology. Computers
pose no threat to the public policy underlying patent law nor
does a workable test for determining statutory subject matter
under § 101 require altering 200 years of policy development.
B. AN INTERPRETIVE APPROACH TO STATUTORY SUBJECT
MATTER FOR CLAIMS INCORPORATING A MATHEMATICAL
EXPRESSION
This Comment presents a two-part test for determining the
patentability of any claim reciting a mathematical algorithm.
The test first determines the true nature of a claim by defining
the scope of the recited algorithm to include other inventions
that use that algorithm to reach the same ultimate result using
substantially similar means in a substantially similar way.
Armed with the interpreted claim, the test then applies that
claim to principles that divide discovery from invention, thereby
characterizing it as either patentable or unpatentable subject
matter under § 101. The proposed test thus provides a doctri-
nally sound premise for determining statutory subject matter
based on well-rooted principles distinguishing patentable from
unpatentable subject matter, adequately characterizes the role
of mathematics within this distinction, and presents a concrete
method for assessing individual fact situations.
1. "Discovery" vs. "Invention": A Distinction Lost By the
Courts
A tightly-defined test built on a robust discovery and inven-
tion distinction can shed much of the uncertainty from the doc-
trine of patentable subject matter.126 Unfortunately, courts
banter the terms "discovery" and "invention" back and forth
sloppily and blur their fundamental meanings. 127 As stated pre-
means-plus-function language, that recited a mathematical algorithm, and rul-
ing it statutory subject matter).
126. Courts and academics unfortunately have never developed this concep-
tualization, relying instead on broad inventive categorization under headings
such as natural laws and abstract ideas, which can be both under- and over-
inclusive. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (describing the broad stat-
utory inventive classifications).
127. Nearly all § 101 cases recklessly use the terms "discovery" and "inven-
tion." Benson, for example, quoted an earlier Supreme Court decision proclaim-
ing: "One may discover a new and useful improvement in the process of
tanning, dyeing, etc." Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972) (emphasis
added) (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 252, 267-68 (1853)).
Under the principles discussed in this Comment, one must invent such an im-
provement because that improvement is an application of an idea.
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viously, the conceptualized distinction between pure "discovery"
and pure "invention" is critically important to a comprehensive
interpretation of § 101.128 Restated briefly, pure discovery re-
flects the uncovering of natural truths, presumed to be forever in
the public domain of knowledge. 129 This material is placed be-
yond the realm of patentability despite the otherwise broad
reach of the patent laws to new subject matter.130 Pure inven-
tion, on the other hand, represents the physical laws of nature,
which may or may not yet be fully explained by discovery, placed
in practical use in the working world.' 3 ' This subject matter de-
fines the heart of § 101.
The inventive process frequently includes elements of dis-
covery, and any patentability test must carefully distinguish be-
tween the two. Importantly, the current § 101 controversy does
not center on any fundamental misunderstanding of the basic
policies underlying patent law, for these policies have been
firmly established since the origin of the American patent sys-
tem.132 Nevertheless, courts have failed to develop fully a useful
model for dealing with cases that fall within the continuum be-
tween pure invention and pure discovery that carefully distin-
guishes elements of the two without impermissibly importing
concepts of novelty and nonobviousness into § 101.133 Alappat
Admittedly, much of this confusion comes from the language of § 101 itself
that proclaims "[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter" may obtain a patent. 35'
U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (emphasis added). This choice of language, while unfortu-
nate, cannot cloud principles distinguishing pure "discovery" from pure
"invention."
128. See supra part 1-A2 (outlining the distinction between discovery and
invention based on the policies underlying patent protection of technology).
129. See supra note 35 and accompanying text (defining pure discovery).
130. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text (describing congressional
intent of liberal construction of § 101).
131. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (explaining an inventor's le-
gitimate claim to an exclusive right to her invention).
132. The Jeffersonian principles of subject matter patentability under which
the American patent system was formed over two centuries ago have remained
remarkably unchanged, as evidenced by the consistency of § 101's language.
See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text (describing the legislative history
of § 101). Today most still agree with the basic premise that one cannot obtain
a patent for the discovery of a law of nature. Cf In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526,
1542 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (classifying laws of nature, natural phenomena,
and abstract ideas as unpatentable subject matter).
133. A number of judicially-crafted tests examining mathematical algo-
rithms in the context of § 101 have imported concepts of novelty and nonobvi-
ousness. Flook, for example, seemed to resurrect the CCPA's "point of novelty"
test for patent claims reciting a mathematical algorithm. Parker v. Flook, 437
U.S. 584, 591 (1978). This test in essence removed the algorithm from the claim
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illustrates this inability: the court found patentable an inven-
tion clearly incorporating elements of both invention and discov-
ery without enunciating a reasoned decision.' 34
Perhaps the best illustration of the distinction between in-
vention and discovery may be made using a series of simple ex-
amples. One of humanity's first inventions, the wheel, was
unquestionably developed without a complete understanding of
the physical truths embodied by Newtonian mechanics (compet-
ing forces, friction, and the like). Nonetheless, this pioneering
invention proved itself useful in a multitude of daily tasks and
has enjoyed millennia of use and improvement. The wheel was
thus pure invention-an advancement virtually unexplained by
its developers. At the opposite extreme, the development of
early quantum mechanics by such noteworthy scientists as Niels
Bohr and Erwin Schrdinger 13 5 showed little inventive utility
until the explosion of the first atomic weapon decades later.136
Quantum mechanics was therefore pure discovery-a theoreti-
cal advancement without immediate utility. In the middle of
this broad spectrum lies most of today's industrial work. Scien-
tists and engineers now work synergetically in international in-
dustry to expand humanity's understanding of the physical
world and develop new products for the ever-expanding
marketplace. 137
and asked whether what was left was either well known or obvious to the art.
The claim would fail if the algorithm was the sole novel or nonobvious element
of the claim. Id. at 594. For a discussion of these cases, see MERGES, supra note
24, at 66.
The F/ook Court apparently based its decision on the supposition that the
equation used in the method for updating a process alarm limit was the sole
point of novelty in the patent claim. 437 U.S. at 588. The Court, however, was
careful to reiterate that § 101 stands as a predicate to the other patentability
requirements of novelty and nonobviousness. Id. at 593. In addition, the
Court, only a few years later in Diehr, reiterated its construction of § 101 as a
predicate test by stating: " he question... of whether a particular invention is
novel is wholly apart from whether the invention falls into a category of statu-
tory subject matter." Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 190 (1981) (quotation
omitted); see also supra note 62 and accompanying text (exploring this issue).
134. Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1437-39, 1544-45.
135. Bohr's atomic model and Schr~dinger's equation are fundamentals of
modem quantum mechanics. For a discussion of these marvelous scientific ad-
vancements, see generally RiCHARD P. FEYNmIN ET AL., THE FEYNMAN LEC-
TURES ON PHYsics: QUANTUM MEcIA~cCS (1965).
136. The explosion of the first atomic bomb on July 16, 1945, was the first
real application of quantum mechanics and atomic theory. THE CONCISE Co-
LUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 52 (2d ed. 1989).
137. The 3M Company illustrates a successful model of corporate technology
development that uses this synergy. By hiring basic researchers who are ex-
perts in a particular scientific field and disseminating their findings to product
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Developing a comprehensive test for § 101 requires recogni-
tion of today's scientific and industrial realities. It is axiomatic
that all inventions operate according to the collective physical
laws of nature even if their underlying truths are not yet fully
understood by discovery.138 The key to identifying a new idea as
patentable or unpatentable is to carefiflly analyze the workings
of the disclosed product or process to determine the nature and
function of each claimed element. In accordance with analyzing
the claim as a whole,13 9 the invention can fall within § 101 only
if the elements of that claim perform a valid function within the
claim apart from the mere explanatory recitation of an abstract
truth or law of nature.
2. Mathematics as a Proxy for Natural "Truths"
At some point in the tortured history of the interpretation of
§ 101,140 all of mathematics was tossed into the bin of nonstatu-
tory subject matter, apparently on the assumption that any
mathematical expression functions only to describe a natural
truth.14 1 Taking a step back, mathematics is best characterized
developers, an information network is created throughout 3M. See, e.g.,
Thomas J. Martin, Ten Commandments for Managing Creative People, FOR-
TUNE, Jan. 16, 1995, at 135 (praising 3M's innovative infrastructure).
138. The collective laws of physics have governed all matter within the uni-
verse since its creation; nothing can escape these forces. Interestingly, Chief
Judge Archer's Alappat dissent begins with a lengthy quote from an 1873 pat-
ent law treatise detailing this concept. 33 F.3d at 1551-52 (Archer, C.J., dis-
senting) (quoting GEORGE CuRTis, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF PATENTs FOR
USEFUL INVENTIONS xxiii-xxv (4th ed. 1873)).
139. The Supreme Court has clearly mandated the interpretation of a claim
as a whole. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981) ("In determining the
eligibility of respondents' claimed process for patent protection under § 101,
their claims must be considered as a whole.").
140. See supra part I.B.1 (describing the Supreme Courts interpretations of
§ 101).
141. Benson dealt with the patentability of a mathematical expression, but
one can question whether, because the Court meticulously traced the history of
patentable subject matter standards through the prism of traditional prohibi-
tions of laws of nature and abstract ideas, only those mathematical expressions
uniquely describing a law of nature or an abstract idea were placed beyond
§ 101. Of course, broadly speaking, the Court enunciated its rules with respect
to mathematical algorithms, which it defined as "[a] procedure for solving a
given type of mathematical problem." Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 65
(1972). In Flook the Court was more direct, expanding Benson by stating: "In
[Benson], we held that the discovery of a novel and useful mathematical
formula may not be patented." Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585 (1978).
For a detailed discussion of the Court's identification of mathematics with
laws of nature and abstract ideas, see Irah H. Donner & J. Randall Beckers,
Throwing Out Baby Benson with the Bath Water: Proposing a New Test For
Determining Statutory Subject Matter, COMPUTER LAW., Jan. 1993, at 8, 10-12.
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as a tool of science, a mere means of expression. Mathematics
serves as a universal language whose utility allows both inven-
tors and discoverers alike to describe and transcribe their work,
and because of this utility, means-plus-function claim drafting
allowable under § 112 I 6 becomes a convenient mode for effi-
cient patent writing.142
Mathematical expressions may be used to describe both dis-
covered and invented subject matter and are therefore imperfect
proxies for mathematical truths and other laws of nature. No
one could doubt, for example, that Einstein's E = mc2 describes a
natural law. The equation states an hypothesized truth: that
energy and mass are directly proportional by the speed of light
squared. Its recitation standing alone says nothing of any par-
ticular process or object. It instead speaks broadly of the behav-
ior of any body of mass. Conversely, suppose that a machine
exists such that, for whatever reason, two parameters must be
set for its efficient operation. One may set the first parameter
by choosing from some range of values, but once the first is set,
the second must be twice the first. In other words, letting the
first parameter value be denoted by the letter "a" and the second
by the letter "b," the relationship between the two may be ex-
pressed as "a = 2b," a simple mathematical equation. In this
case, the recited mathematical expression is purely empirical,
particular to the process it describes. If recited in a patent claim
to that process, absent the absurd argument that the claim is
Donner and Beckers present an interesting test predicated on the notion that
certain equations do not uniquely describe a law of nature and therefore should
constitute patentable subject matter under § 101. Id. at 13. The authors argue
that the far reach of the applications of the BCD to binary conversion method
claimed in the patent primarily threatened the Supreme Court in Benson. Id.
at 9. From this argument they craft a test allowing for the patentability of
equations characterized as "engineering approximations" if they allow suffi-
ciently available alternatives for other applications. Id. at 11.
Although this test has some practical utility, its results are unjustified
under principles of patent law governing the distinction between discovery and
invention. Instead of carefily examining the nature of the claim as a whole,
this test concerns itself only with practical concerns of available alternatives.
Like Fook's prohibition of arbitrary field of use limitations, a mathematical
expression does not magically become patentable subject matter simply be-
cause, ipso facto, it is expressly narrowed to the context of its intended use. See
supra note 63 and accompanying text (discussing Flook). If the equation consti-
tutes a discovery, it is unpatentable regardless of the scope of its utility. The
challenge is to find a coherent way to determine if a patent claim reciting a
mathematical equation covers subject matter best characterized as discovery or
invention.
142. This is the method of claim drafting Alappat chose. See supra part 1.C
(describing means-plus-function language).
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intended to encompass all multiplication by two, the algorithm
is patentable as part of the claimed process, because it is serving
only as a tool to express its operation.
Some finesse is therefore required to arrive at a subject
matter test for inventions using mathematical algorithms.
Again, no generalized rule makes sense if divorced from the con-
text of the invention at hand, but one may envision categories of
purely empirical equations so completely unique to a given in-
vention that they merely describe an applied process or appara-
tus.143 Thus, to determine the patentability of a claim involving
mathematics, one must first in some way identify the scope of
the function of the mathematical expression recited in the pat-
ent claim. If that scope is so broad that it fully includes the ex-
pression of an abstract truth or idea, the claim is unpatentable
under well-settled principles of patent law.'" If, instead, the
scope is limited to the communication or description of a portion
of the invention performing some application of a broader idea,
it is clearly patentable under equally well-settled patent law
principles.145
3. The Penumbra of a Patent Claim
American patent law characterizes a patent claim as a prop-
erty right whose language attempts to assert the extent, or
scope, of the invention it discloses.146 Paradoxically, however, it
is impossible to define precisely the boundaries of a patent's
scope at any time during its lifetime, because the boundaries are
carved out inch by inch as the patented product or process inter-
acts with the marketplace. 14 7 This process occurs because
others build upon a patent's disclosure by developing competing
143. In principle it does not matter whether a claim recites a process or an
apparatus. See supra note 121 (explaining that Federal Circuit cases recognize
that both apparatus and process claims may fail § 101).
144. Such a broad expression must be classified as a discovery. See supra
notes 32-36 and accompanying text (distinguishing discovery from invention).
Of course, courts have implicitly recognized this concept by their long-standing
prohibition on patents directed to an abstract idea or a law of nature. See supra
note 41 and accompanying text (tracing the prohibition's historical stability).
145. Such a narrow expression must be classified as invention. See supra
notes 32-36 and accompanying text (distinguishing invention from discovery).
146. The claims of a patent assert the "metes & bounds" of the property
right. See supra note 16 (describing the parts of a patent).
147. Because the primary purpose behind awarding patents is to encourage
public dissemination of emerging technology, this is indeed a designed and pub-
licly beneficial effect. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text (outlining
the purposes underlying patent protection).
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technologies once that patent becomes public knowledge,'148 and
it is only when a patent owner reacts to the competition by as-
serting his or her patent rights in individual challenges that the
scope of a patent begins to take shape.' 49 A penumbra therefore
envelops the literal description of any invention, a sphere of un-
certainty clouding the meaning of any individual element. Cer-
tainty comes only by way of a series of later ad hoc factual
comparisons by courts with other specific embodiments.
In attempting to define sufficiently this penumbra within
the narrow context of a single infringement case, courts are
aided by a doctrine of equivalents. 50 A basic test of
equivalency' 5 ' brings another invention, one similar but not lit-
erally identical to the invention embodied by the patent, 15 2 into
the patent's penumbra if the accused invention performs sub-
stantially the same function in substantially the same way to
obtain the same result.153 Although the nuances of the full and
148. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (describing public access to
emerging technology as one of the purposes of patent law).
149. In other words, to enforce her property right, a patent owner must
bring an infringement suit against someone she believes is practicing her pat-
ent as claimed.
150. When a patent owner brings an infringement suit she must demon-
strate that the defendant's practice falls within her patent's claim. She can do
this in two ways. She can demonstrate that the language of her claim literally
covers the defendant's practice in which case that practice literally infringes the
patent. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607
(1950). Alternatively, she can assert that the defendant's practice, though not
literally identical to the claim language, nonetheless falls within a range of le-
gally-defined equivalents. Id. The test governing this legally-defined range of
equivalents is known as the doctrine of equivalents. Id. at 608. Although a
detailed discussion of this doctrine commands many articles of its own, its ele-
ments aid in the development of a test governing statutory subject matter. For
a general discussion on patent infringement and the doctrine of equivalents, see
JOHN W. SCHLICHER, PATENT LAw: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCiPLES § 7.04
(1994).
151. This basic equivalency standard is borrowed from the context of in-
fringement as enumerated in the seminal case Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607-
09. It is important to note here that using an equivalency test to interpret the
entire scope of the claim prior to the issue of a patent and using the test in a
narrow contest between two comparative examples in the context of infringe-
ment are very different beasts. The basic test of equivalency, so termed in this
Comment, is borrowed from the infringement context and used only to approxi-
mate the outer boundaries of a claim to determine its patentability.
152. Again, an invention identical to that embodied by a patent claim liter-
ally infringes that patent. For a discussion of literal infringement, see
Sc-mHFcHE, supra note 150, § 7.04.
153. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608; see also ScImcHER, supra note 150,
§ 7.04(16) (noting Graver Tank as the seminal case regarding the doctrine of
equivalents)
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elaborate doctrine of equivalents are by no means self-evi-
dent,15 4 its basic tenets allow one to at least conceptually sketch
the boundaries of a patent claim. With this conceptualization at
hand, the scope of a claim reciting a mathematical algorithm
may be estimated, and this estimation helps address the central
preemption concerns of Benson and its progeny without unnec-
essarily incorporating novelty and nonobviousness elements be-
yond the scope of § 101.155
4. A Functionality-Based Test of Statutory Subject Matter
A rational statutory subject matter test under § 101 for
claims reciting a mathematical algorithm must connect the esti-
mation of a claim's scope, determined by the basic equivalency
test, with the distinction between discovery and invention.156 A
two-part test emerges from this union that will define the scope
and function of any suspicious claim element and subsequently
compare that element to nonpatentable abstract ideas and laws
of nature. Hence, the first part of the test borrows the basic test
of equivalency to determine the scope of a claim. Armed with
the interpreted claim's scope, the second part of the test applies
that claim to principles dividing discovery from invention to
characterize it as either patentable or unpatentable subject mat-
ter under § 101. Although this test can cover any type of
claim, 157 it proves of greatest value for evaluating claims recit-
ing a mathematical algorithm.
Application of the test requires first an inquiry into the true
nature and function of a recited mathematical algorithm within
a claim by examining the range of that claim's legal
154. See, e.g., Martin J. Adelman & Gary L. Francione, The Doctrine of
Equivalents in Patent Law: Questions that Pennwalt Did Not Answer, 137 U.
PA. L. REv 673,680-03 (1989) (pointing out flaws in the doctrine of equivalents).
155. See supra note 133 (discussing the incorporation of novelty and nonob-
viousness into § 101).
156. See supra part III.B.1 (discussing this conceptualized distinction).
157. The proposed test may also prove useful in other areas of patentability
not immediately within the scope of this Comment. The scope of a claim to a
method of doing business, for example, can also be estimated by examining
other methods whose elements perform substantially the same function in sub-
stantially the same manner to achieve the same result. See, e.g., Hotel Security
Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 46,47 (2d Cir. 1908) (discussing the classic
arguments surrounding the patentability of business methods). If this scope,
thus defined, constitutes nothing more than a general idea, it must fail § 101.
On the other hand, if that scope defines a specific application of an idea, then it
constitutes a valid invention.
1160
PATENTING ALGORITHMS
equivalents.' 58 If that range of equivalents fully encompasses a
mathematical algorithm that describes a natural truth, then
that claim must fail, because it crosses the line to pure discov-
ery. If, instead, that range of equivalents encompasses only a
specific application of a natural law, that claim permissibly re-
cites patentable inventive subject matter.
Again, the test is best illustrated by its application. Con-
sider the previous example involving the process incorporating
the "a = 2b" equation.' 59 Suppose the claim to the entire pro-
cess, whatever it may be, were written to incorporate the equa-
tion within the claim as "including a method for selecting the
value of parameter b such that b = a/2." Applying the basic
equivalency test to this claim,' 60 its scope only encompasses
other processes that achieve the same result as the process of
the claim by using elements performing substantially the same
function in substantially the same way.' 6 ' Whatever the precise
embodiments of these equivalents, clearly not all multiplication
by two comes within the definition, because to find equivalency,
the accused process must at the very least select specific param-
eters and apply them to a process with the same result as the
one claimed. Recognizing this functionality demonstrates that
the mathematical algorithm does more than recite a natural
truth and that the claim as a whole is inventive.
Applying the test to the claims at issue in Benson,'62 no in-
consistency arises with the Supreme Court's result in that case.
Benson's claim recited a method for converting a binary coded
158. The term "legal equivalents" is based on the application of the standard
the Supreme Court enunciated in Graver Tank. See supra note 153 and accom-
panying text (detailing this standard).
159. See supra part III.B.2 (demonstrating that mathematical expressions
are imperfect proxies for laws of nature).
160. The test is applied to the claim as a whole in accordance with Diehr.
See supra note 139 (quoting Diehr).
161. Again, this is the application of the Graver Tank standard. See supra
note 151 (discussing the standard's origins). Whether this standard requires a
finding of equivalency element-by-element or is applied to the claim as a whole
remains controversial. Compare Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833
F.2d 931, 939 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1009 (1987) (holding that an
accused fruit sorting machine did not infringe the patent because not all of the
elements of the machine were equivalent) with Corning Glass Works v.
Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding that
optical fibers that substituted a negative dopant for the positive dopant consti-
tuted patent infringement under the doctrine of equivalents).
162. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972); see also supra part I.B.1 (dis-
cussing Benson). The Benson Court found the claims to a method for converting
binary coded decimal numerals to binary numerals did not constitute statutory
subject matter. 409 U.S. at 71-02.
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decimal (BCD) numerical expression into a pure binary numeri-
cal expression.' 63 The scope of this claim, again, may be inter-
preted to include other processes that achieve the same result
using elements performing substantially the same function in
substantially the same way.' 64 Here, any method for converting
a BCD to a binary expression achieves an identical result. In
addition, these other methods will necessarily use substantially
identical means, all placing numerical "1"s in designated posi-
tions, whether within or without the context of shift registers.
The scope of Benson's claims, therefore, fully encompasses a
mathematical truth, namely, that BCDs may uniquely find a nu-
merically equivalent binary expression. Finding this truth, the
test reveals that the claim is directed to a discovery, not an
invention.
Applying the test next to the claim at issue in Diehr,65 the
results are once more consistent with the Supreme Court's find-
ing that the claim presented statutory subject matter.'66 Diehr
claimed a method of operating a rubber-molding press with the
aid of a digital computer programmed to calculate a form of the
Arrhenius equation.167 Again the equivalency test applied to
this claim extends the scope of this claim only to other processes
resulting in the operation of a press that use elements perform-
163. See supra notes 46-55 and accompanying text (discussing the case in
detail). One of the two similar rejected claims provided:
Claim 8:
The method of converting signals from binary coded decimal form
into binary which comprises the steps of
(1) storing the binary coded decimal signals in a reentrant shift
register,
(2) shifting the signals to the right by at least three places, until
there is a binary '1' in the second position of said register,
(3) masking out said binary '1' in said second position of said
register,
(4) adding a binary T to the first position of said register,
(5) shifting the signals to the left by two positions,
(6) adding a '1' to said first position, and
(7) shifting the signals to the right by at least three positions in
preparation for a succeeding binary '1' in the second position of said
register.
Benson, 409 U.S. at 73-74.
164. See supra note 153 and accompanying text (enunciating the
equivalency standard).
165. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981); see also supra part I.B.1
(discussing Diehr).
166. The Diehr Court ruled that the claims at issue constituted statutory
subject matter under § 101. 450 U.S. at 191-92.
167. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (describing Diehr's
invention).
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ing substantially the same functions in substantially the same
way.168 Here, processes falling within the scope do not include
all solutions of a generic Arrhenius equation because, like the
first presented example, infringing embodiments must select pa-
rameters for use in the equation and apply them to the operation
of a press before a finding of equivalency is justified.169 Because
the claim does not fully encompass a natural truth, it may legiti-
mately command the label of invention and enjoy status as stat-
utory subject matter under § 101.170
Finally, the tests rationality and predictability are con-
firmed by applying it to In re Trovato.171 Trovato involved the
development of a method having broad utility, potentially valua-
ble as a way to optimize any number of physical problems.1 72
Using the first part of the test to sketch the scope of the claim as
presented,173 its breadth may be appreciated, as any optimiza-
tion process using elements performing substantially the same
function in substantially the same way will fall within the
claim's penumbra. This claim, as drafted, therefore incorporates
any method of optimization comprising a graphical representa-
tion of a physical problem, like a street map, wherein a "goal"
state or point may be reached along any number of paths and
wherein the optimal path is determined by logical deduction ac-
counting for any number of desired variables (cost, distance,
etc.). 174 At the test's next level, the claim does not constitute
168. See supra note 153 and accompanying text (enunciating the
equivalency standard).
169. This limitation on the scope of the generic Arrhenius equation is not a
mere arbitrary field of use limitation; rather, it is a limitation on the scope of
the claim based upon the functionality of the Arrhenius equations as used in
the claimed process. Of course, there indeed may be a fine line distinguishing
the outcomes of Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191-03, and Flook, 437 U.S. at 600, but
those two cases, decided within three years of each other, were decided by nar-
row margins largely split over a dispute concerning the proper role of field of
use limitations. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (setting forth the
arguments of the majority and dissent in Fook).
170. Of course, to eventually qualify for protection as a patent, the invention
must subsequently satisfy the other statutory requirements of novelty and non-
obviousness. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (setting forth these stat-
utory requirements).
171. 33 U.S.P.Q.2d 1194 (Fed. Cir. 1994); see also supra note 82-85 and
accompanying text (discussing Trovato).
172. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (describing the invention).
173. See supra note 83 (quoting a representative claim).
174. Of course any patent claim is construed in light of and is defined by the
specification's disclosure. Here, however, the specification disclosed only flow
charts and program code computing the least cost path to a given goal state
based on data in a configuration space. 33 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1197.
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patentable subject matter because it is discovery. All optimiza-
tion processes incorporate some "shortest path" solution. The
discoverers here uncovered and explained a systematic method
of data structure and graphical analysis useful for any such
process.
Although the application presented to the Patent Office in
Travato failed to disclose a patentable "invention," one was not
far from hand. If the application had explained and claimed a
method unique to a given physical optimization process so that
the equations presented by the specification were empirical to
that process, it would have disclosed an invention. This would
be true regardless of whether the equations were embodied by
physical structure, programmed into physical hardware, and
could be classifed as a "machine" under § 101.175 The applicants,
for example, could have disclosed a method for determining the
shortest and most cost-efficient path for emergency vehicles,
presenting a set of empirical, mathematically-based algorithms
that overcame problems unique to that process. Comparing once
more to the hypothetical process having the "a=2b" relationship
between two variables, 176 perhaps some similar relationship ex-
ists for plotting the movement of emergency vehicles. Given the
number of vehicles stored in a facility, perhaps an alternative
relationship exists between that number and the shortest path
that may be explained by a mathematical relationship. 177 If
such were the case, the applicants' method would exploit their
discovery and place it in practical use to achieve a physical re-
sult in the working world. This "invention" would therefore con-
stitute patentable subject matter under § 101.
C. AN ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS OF ALAPPAT'S CLAIM USING THE
FUNCTIONALITY-BASED TEST
Alappat drafted the claim to his apparatus by taking advan-
tage of means-plus-function claim language.178 That Alappat
chose to use this language has no effect on the application of the
175. See supra note 2 (quoting § 101).
176. See supra part III.B.2 (presenting this example).
177. If it were determined, for example, that the number of vehicles kept in
the storage facility was directly proportional to the ultimate time required to
reach the "goal" point, the following mathematical relationship would then gov-
ern the relationship:
Ultimate Time = x * No. of Vehicles
where x = some proportionality constant
178. See supra note 100 (quoting the disputed claim).
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presented test; indeed, in the special case of means language
formatting, some notion of equivalency is statutorily man-
dated.1-79 Although, as discussed previously, the Federal Circuit
mentioned the scope of equivalency under Alappat's claim, 18 0 it
instead decided the case on the premise that all genuine appara-
tus claims satisfy the requirements of § 101. L81
In applying the approach of the functionality test to Alap-
pat's rasterizer claim, the first step is to determine the scope of
the recited mathematical algorithm in the context of the claim
as a whole using the basic test of equivalency described by this
Comment. As disclosed in the specification, Alappat's rasterizer
used a circuit board programmed to solve a unique set of equa-
tions developed to yield desired anti-aliasing effects on a finite
pixel cathode-ray tube (CRT).' 8 2 Applying the equivalency test
to the disclosed structure, the claim's scope extends to any appa-
ratus producing an anti-aliasing waveform on a CRT screen us-
ing elements performing substantially the same function in
substantially the same way.
Taken in this direction the similarity -to the invention of
Diehr becomes evident, as both encompass a programmed com-
puter to obtain a specified result. 83 In taking the model the
next step further, the cases exactly parallel one another. Alap-
pat's claim, like Diehr's, is not drawn to an algorithm qua al-
gorithm. Instead, these equations have an integral relationship
with the invention's purpose and have within them an implicit,
but real, use limitation. Because infringing embodiments of
Alappats claim must make use of an equation to produce a spec-
ified result, the algorithm recited by the claim does not identi-
cally describe a natural law or abstract idea, and the line of
invention is crossed. Alappat may have discovered the al-
gorithm he chose, but he and his colleagues put that algorithm
179. 35 U.S.C. § 112 6 (1988); see also supra note 88 (quoting § 112 6).
Although the doctrine of equivalents used in the context of infringement and
the equivalency governing § 112 6 are not identical, the basic concepts are the
same. See supra notes 150-152 and accompanying text (discussing these two
standards).
180. The majority mentioned this only in passing. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d
1526, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc).
181. See supra part H (discussing Alappat).
182. See supra note 99 (detailing Alappat's invention).
183. Diehr's invention used a computer programmed with a form of the Ar-
rhenius equation to cure rubber, and Alappat used a programmed computer to
produce a smooth waveform on the screen of an oscilloscope. See supra notes
66, 99 and accompanying text (discussing these two inventions in detail).
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to work in an invention to produce a useful result. That inven-
tion therefore deserves the protection that only a patent affords.
CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit's approach to the patentability of com-
puter-related inventions in In re Alappat fails to bring the con-
sistency to § 101 that is desperately needed in an era of rapidly
changing technology. Developers, manufactures, and consumers
of computer-related technologies require a stable and reliable
way to make market choices based to a large degree on the pro-
tection afforded these products under intellectual property law.
Patent law must indeed walk a fine line, providing a requisite
predictability commanded by our Anglo-American legal system
while always presiding over a world of new and changing tech-
nologies. The interpretive test of patentable subject matter
presented in this Comment rationally estimates the scope of a
patent claim and applies that estimation to a well-defined rela-
tionship distinguishing discovery from invention. This test,
which is predicated on more than 200 years of legal foundation,
can define the necessary fine line and, in so doing, provide a
more meaningful and comfortable result for Kuriappan Alappat
and his colleagues.
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